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Abstract: 
This paper examines the role of time in Just War theory. It maintains that 
contemporary Just War theory’s legalist focus on rules and principles, rather than 
judgment and interpretation, makes a serious engagement with timing appear quite 
irrelevant. To deal with this shortcoming, the paper clarifies the dual nature of 
political time as both chronos and kairos. It is argued that a cogent account of the 
justice of warfare needs to incorporate the two faces of political time. I show that a 
casuistic re-orientation of Just War theory would also have the beneficial effect of 
putting critique back on the agenda. The moral core of my argument is that judgment 
and interpretation ought to be guided by the spirit of “pragmatic fallibilism”, thereby 
combining the willingness to assertively uphold one’s values with a disposition to 
revise, through reflection and deliberation, one’s commitments. 
This is a pre-print/pre-proofread draft. 1 
I. Timing: An Undertheorized Dimension of Political Action 
In the late summer of 2012, Israeli politicians considerably raised the pressure on Iran 
by asserting that the time for diplomacy around Iran’s nuclear program was about to 
run out. The underlying threat was, of course, unambiguous: either Iran yielded to the 
demands of dismantling its nuclear program, or fatal strikes would be launched on its 
research facilities.1 Israeli politicians sought to substantiate their dark warnings 
through the notion of “preventive self-defense” – a concept that stands on shaky 
ground from the standpoint of international law. As we know today, Israel has not 
(yet) followed up on its threat; but this kind of rhetoric is all too common in our days. 
One way of looking at this ongoing standoff would be in terms of specifying the 
reasons for preemptive attacks: What sorts of imminent threat from a state or non-
state actor would allow the targeted state to engage in a preemptive attack, which is 
legitimate under international law? Do we need to re-think the crucial difference 
between prevention and preemption in light of evolving types of coercion, such as the 
covert development of nuclear weapons capability?2 A different way of seeing Israel’s 
pressure on Iran would be as an effort to control political time. By intimating that 
diplomacy had run its course, Israel tried to regain the upper hand in the controversy 
                                                
1 Isabel Kershner, “Israeli Foreign Ministry Calls for More Sanctions on Iran,” The New York Times, 
September 27, 2012, sec. World/Middle East, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/28/world/middleeast/israeli-foreign-ministry-calls-for-more-
sanctions-on-iran.html. 
2 On the discussion around prevention and preemption see: Michael W. Doyle, Striking First: 
Preemption and Prevention in International Conflict, ed. Stephen Macedo (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2008); David Luban, “Preventive War,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 32, no. 3 
(2004): 207–48; Henry Shue and David Rodin, eds., Preemption: Military Action and Moral 
Justification (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
This is a pre-print/pre-proofread draft. 2 
over Iran’s nuclear weapons. Interestingly, the American Presidential elections 
supplied an important temporal layer: pundits insisted that the elections’ date would 
mark a watershed moment for Israel’s capacity to start an attack.3 On this perspective, 
the chief questions are: When is the right time for a political or military initiative? 
Which critical tools do we have to evaluate the claims of political actors that the time 
is right to strike? 
In what follows, I pursue two goals: The first is to elucidate why Just War theorists 
have until now mostly ignored the topic of time. To put my argument in a nutshell, 
the reason has to do with contemporary Just War theory’s methodological bent 
towards rules and principles, at the expense of case-based reasoning.4 In its drive 
towards – what Judith Shklar called – legalism, contemporary Just War theory tends 
to conceive of time purely in terms of a measure (chronos), instead of paying 
attention to the complex ways in which time structures action (kairos). The paper’s 
second goal is to sketch the moral core of an alternative vision of Just War theory, in 
which both sides of political time – chronos and kairos – are given their due. Once we 
realize that it is problematic to conceive of time purely in terms of a measure, it 
                                                
3 Joshua Gleis, “How the Presidential Election Could Lead to an Israeli Strike on Iran,” Huffington 
Post, June 3, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joshua-gleis/obama-israel-iran_b_1322934.html. 
4 According to my understanding, “case-based reasoning” is synonymous with casuistry – a 
philosophical method in ethics that will be discussed in detail in section II. I therefore invite the reader 
to interpret “casuistic” throughout this paper in a non-polemical way; or, to put it more precisely: in 
line with Jonsen and Toulmin’s main idea, I seek to rescue casuistry from its disrepute, by 
demonstrating that it “redresses the excessive emphasis placed on universal rules and invariant 
principles by moral philosophers and political preachers alike”. See: Albert R. Jonsen and Stephen 
Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1988), 13. 
This is a pre-print/pre-proofread draft. 3 
becomes imperative to casuistically investigate the empirical circumstances of justice 
within which a political or military initiative is launched. I shall argue that the 
necessary faculties of judgment and interpretation need to be guided by the spirit of 
“pragmatic fallibilism”, thereby combining the willingness to assertively uphold one’s 
values with a disposition to revise, through reflection and deliberation, one’s 
commitments. That is why this paper’s gist is constructive, and not polemical; its 
objective is to remedy a shortcoming in a particular strand of Just War theory so as to 
render the discussion around the permissible use of force more productive. 
The outline of the paper is as follows: I begin by delineating the Just War tradition’s 
genealogy and clarify the extent to which rules and principles have become the focal 
point in the contemporary debate. Then, I illustrate how this methodological bent 
impinges on the understanding of time in contemporary Just War theory (section II). 
The next step leads me to unpack the prevalent distinction in ancient Greek, and later 
Roman culture between chronos and kairos. The purpose of this turn to ancient 
philosophy is to recuperate for the contemporary debate the idea that normal, 
measurable time (chronos) should to be held apart from qualitative, actionable time 
(kairos) (section III). Finally, I submit that, for a critical approach to Just War theory, 
we need a complex understanding of political time that brings together its chronotic 
and its kairotic elements. I conclude by gesturing towards the idea of “pragmatic 
fallibilism” to illuminate how judgment and interpretation can assist us in making 
sense of political time. The idea here is that, if we are to steer Just War theory towards 
a stronger commitment to contextual analysis, it will be beneficial to mobilize some 
of the key insights of pragmatism – not in terms of a full-fledged system to rival 
legalism, but rather as a flexible framework that could orient the judging and 
interpreting of real-world conflicts (section IV). 
This is a pre-print/pre-proofread draft. 4 
 
I.1. Preliminary Caveats 
Before proceeding with the substantive argument, three short provisos on the paper’s 
objectives are in order: (1) My referring to “Just War theory” might be read as if there 
was only one, uniform way of thinking about justice in war. Just War theory today is, 
of course, a pluralistic enterprise that contains many different, sometimes conflicting 
approaches.5 Therefore, the paper concedes that not every strand of Just War theory 
will necessarily conform to the picture I shall paint. To be clear from the outset, my 
concerns will mainly be channeled at one particular, legalist strand that pays scant 
attention to contextual factors when assessing the morality of warfare. 
(2) Even though a reflection on political time cannot be found in the literature, my 
objections to some strands in Just War theory build on an already well-established 
corpus of critiques. Several commentators have recently commenced to interrogate its 
overly legalistic character.6 As with any form of critique, the issue is whether it 
aspires to be radical or remedial; that is, whether it rejects a set of ideas in its entirety, 
or whether it strives to renegotiate a hegemonic reading of these ideas. The arguments 
                                                
5 For some of the most important recent contributions see: Alex J. Bellamy, Just Wars: From Cicero to 
Iraq (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006); Cécile Fabre, Cosmopolitan War (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012); Jeff McMahan, Killing in War, Uehiro Series in Practical Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2009); David Rodin and Henry Shue, eds., Just and Unjust Warriors: The Moral and Legal 
Status of Soldiers (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
6 For a good overview of these critical positions see the articles in Ethics and International Affairs 27, 
no. 1 (2013). An important resource for those who wish to revise contemporary Just War theory’s focus 
on abstract rules and principles is the Journal of Military Ethics, whose authors regularly engage in the 
kind of exercise I am advocating as well. See also: Andrew G. Fiala, Practical Pacifism (New York: 
Algora Publishing, 2004); Andrew G. Fiala, The Just War Myth: The Moral Illusions of War (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2008). 
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about time proposed in this paper fall within the remedial camp. I thus remain 
committed to the assumption that assessing the use of force is an important endeavor 
we should not forsake. Yet, I would also assert that we must alter the framework 
within which this assessment is often undertaken. 
(3) Finally, I need to make explicit whom this paper ideally addresses. My argument 
is simultaneously geared towards two audiences: political actors and critics. By 
pleading for more judgment and interpretation in reaching a decision, the paper raises 
the bar of responsibility for political actors who plan to use force. At the same time, 
this framework enables critics to check whether those with authority have indeed met 
their obligations when deciding about a military initiative. It is in this vein that the 
following thoughts are supposed to be beneficial for both prospective action-guidance 
and retrospective appraisal. 
 
II. Just War Theory: From Case-Based Reasoning to Analytical Construction 
Questions of timing undoubtedly pervade many debates in global politics, as 
numerous cases indicate, from the delayed reaction to the genocide in Rwanda to the 
enduring crisis in Syria. Whereas empirical political scientists have envisaged 
political time as a suitable topic of inquiry for quantitative research, institutional 
design and policy analysis7, political theorists have only lately commenced to pay 
more attention to the normative nature of time. This interest has led them to scrutinize 
                                                
7 For a representative selection of recent publications see: Suzanna De Boef and Luke Keele, “Taking 
Time Seriously,” American Journal of Political Science 52, no. 1 (2008): 184–200; Juan J. Linz, 
“Democracy’s Time Constraints,” International Political Science Review/Revue Internationale de 
Science Politique 19, no. 1 (1998): 19–37, doi:10.2307/1601292; Stephen Skowronek, Presidential 
Leadership in Political Time: Reprise and Reappraisal (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008). 
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such diverse issues as cosmopolitanism8, sovereignty9, deliberation10 and democracy11. 
From an International Relations perspective, scholarly attention to the intricacies of 
political time in the context of war has begun to increase as well. To name just two 
influential interventions in this debate: (1) Taking his cue from the seminal work of 
Paul Virilio12, James Der Derian develops a post-structuralist approach to warfare that 
highlights, amongst other aspects such as simulation and surveillance, its 
“chronopolitical” dimensions.13 Over the past 20 years, Der Derian has been arguing 
that we cannot grasp the changing nature of international relations without 
acknowledging that pace has become more important than space.14 (2) By looking at 
technological revolutions, Herfried Münkler succinctly analyzes the relationship 
                                                
8 Kimberly Hutchings, “What Is Orientation in Thinking? On the Question of Time and Timeliness in 
Cosmopolitical Thought,” Constellations 18, no. 2 (2011): 190–204, doi:10.1111/j.1467-
8675.2011.00633.x. 
9 Paul W. Kahn, “Political Time: Sovereignty and the Transtemporal Community,” Cardozo Law 
Review 28, no. 1 (2006): 259–76. 
10 Sheldon S. Wolin, “What Time Is It?,” Theory & Event 1, no. 1 (1997), doi:10.1353/tae.1991.0003. 
11 Robert E. Goodin, “Keeping Political Time: The Rhythms of Democracy,” International Political 
Science Review/Revue Internationale de Science Politique 19, no. 1 (1998): 39–54. 
12 Paul Virilio, Speed and Politics: An Essay on Dromology (New York: Columbia University, 1986). 
13 James der Derian, “The (S)pace of International Relations: Simulation, Surveillance, and Speed,” 
International Studies Quarterly 34, no. 3 (1990): 295–310, doi:10.2307/2600571.  
14 Several of Der Derian’s essays grapple with the topic of speed. See in particular the following edition 
of selected papers: James Der Derian, Critical Practices in International Theory: Selected Essays 
(London/New York: Routledge, 2009). For a book-length treatment see the earlier: James Der Derian, 
Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992). 
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between military power and the ability to control the speed of a conflict.15 Münkler’s 
investigations of the variable effects of acceleration have disclosed that time is a 
malleable, and often surprising resource in warfare: in an asymmetrical conflict, for 
example, the weaker side has a strategic interest in decelerating the violence.16 
However, while both Der Derian and Münkler seek to thoroughly describe, explain 
and deconstruct the complex role of speed in various types of warfare, they 
deliberately refrain from engaging with the normative questions that lie at the heart of 
this paper’s concerns. 
 
II.1 The Drive Towards Legalism 
If we resolve to confront these normative questions, it quickly becomes evident that 
time poses a peculiar challenge for Just War theory – it cannot be neatly incorporated 
in an ethical theory that is chiefly concerned with the direct application of rules and 
principles. To put it otherwise: an ethical theory that pays scant attention to the 
intricacies of real-world conflicts will approach decisions over timing through the lens 
of pre-defined rules and principles. As I shall try to show, the drive towards legalism 
                                                
15 Herfried Münkler, “Temporal Rhythms and Military Force: Acceleration, Deceleration, and War,” in 
High-Speed Society: Social Acceleration, Power, and Modernity, ed. Hartmut Rosa and William 
Scheuerman (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2009), 243–59. If we look at the 
broader picture, scholars working in the tradition of Critical Theory have over the past 15 years started 
to dissect the topic of speed in illuminating ways. See exemplarily: William E. Connolly, “Speed, 
Concentric Cultures, and Cosmopolitanism,” Political Theory 28, no. 5 (October 2000): 596–618, 
doi:10.2307/192290; Hartmut Rosa, Social Acceleration: A New Theory of Modernity, New Directions 
for Critical Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013). 
16 Herfried Münkler, “The Wars of the 21st Century,” International Review of the Red Cross 85, no. 
849 (2003): 7–22, doi:10.1017/S0035336100103508. 
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has the implication that the complexity of these decisions is significantly 
underestimated. 
In order to elucidate this claim, let us take off by pointing to the far-reaching 
transformation Just War theory has been going through.17 In keeping with Nicholas 
Rengger’s narrative of this transformation, I will in very broad brushes sketch the 
shift away from case-based reasoning towards a legalist framework.18 Rengger puts 
forth the claim that in its early days Just War theory was primarily a project of 
“practical reasoning”19, in the broadest sense of the term. “Practical reasoning” is 
shorthand for the method of casuistry, i.e., for the attempt to develop moral arguments 
from particular cases. Casuistic moral arguments do not pretend to work in all 
circumstances – they only operate in specific contexts, for specific reasons, and with 
specific effects.20 In its classical configuration up until the Middle Ages, Just War 
thinking was first and foremost geared towards the question when and how a 
                                                
17 For two books that provide a thorough overview of this topic see: Cian O’Driscoll, The 
Renegotiation of the Just War Tradition and the Right to War in the Twenty-First Century (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Charles Reed and David Ryall, eds., The Price of Peace: Just War in the 
Twenty-First Century (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
18 Space constraints prevent me from doing justice to the rich history of Just War theory. As a 
consequence, I restrain myself to recounting a story that sticks closely to Rengger’s narrative. After I 
had finished this essay, it came to my attention that Rengger has recently published a book-length 
treatment of the just War tradition, which I unfortunately could not include in this paper. See: Nicholas 
Rengger, Just War and International Order: The Uncivil Condition in World Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
19 Nicholas Rengger, “On the Just War Tradition in the Twenty-First Century,” International Affairs 
78, no. 2 (2002): 360, doi:10.1111/1468-2346.00255. 
20 For the most comprehensive historical account of casuistry see: Jonsen and Toulmin, The Abuse of 
Casuistry. 
This is a pre-print/pre-proofread draft. 9 
sovereign ruler may resort to violence.21 In medieval Europe, Just War theory was 
supposed to directly guide a sovereign when he considered using force to protect the 
political community he was responsible for. At the heart of these references to Just 
War was the distinction between the legitimate public use of force (bellum) and the 
illegitimate private use of force (duellum).22 It was, in short, a tradition in the ethics of 
statecraft. 
In the course of the 17th century this type of reasoning – steering the sovereign 
towards a sensible decision to use force – was, however, gradually supplanted by an 
emerging kind of natural rights theory. The central figure in this development was the 
Dutch statesman and scholar Hugo Grotius, a Renaissance humanist whom many 
deem the founding father of modern international law.23 A useful way of 
                                                
21 In this context, Augustine’s thinking proved fertile. For example, medieval European conflicts, like 
the Hundred Year’s War, were subject to Augustinian lines of moral reasoning. See: Frederick H. 
Russell, “Love and Hate in Medieval Warfare: The Contribution of Saint Augustine,” Nottingham 
Medieval Studies 31, no. 1 (1987): 108–24, doi:10.1484/J.NMS.3.146. On Just War reasoning in the 
Middle Ages more generally see: Frederick H. Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages 
(Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975). 
22 Charles T. Mathewes, Understanding Religious Ethics (Chichester/Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 
187–188; George Weigel, “The Development of Just War Thinking in the Post-Cold War World: An 
American Perspective,” in The Price of Peace: Just War in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Charles Reed 
and David Ryall (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 24, 28. 
23 For a comprehensive summary of the genesis of natural rights theories see: Richard Tuck, The Rights 
of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999). On Grotius’ place in the history of international law and politics, see: 
Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts, eds., Hugo Grotius and International Relations 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); Renée Jeffery, Hugo Grotius in International Thought (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
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characterizing this shift is to describe it as a move towards “legalism”. Judith Shklar, 
who was the first to employ the notion of legalism, uses the term in order to capture 
an “ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule following, and 
moral relationships to consist of duties and rights determined by rules”24. Shklar’s 
admonitions of the perils of legalism need not concern us here, but the general 
ideology she seeks to comprehend is useful for characterizing Just War theory. 
Legalism in Just War theory is a “method of reasoning about the constraints on the 
use of force […] that is based primarily on the formulation of lawlike precepts”25. As 
Rengger argues, the new paradigm marks a drastic change within Just War theory 
itself: 
The dominance in the modern world of notions that emphasize universally 
applicable moral rules by definition makes the kind of moral reasoning 
prevalent in the medieval and early modern just war tradition – casuistical, 
particularist, case-based – extremely difficult. However, there remains the 
requirement for some sort of “just war tradition” in reflecting on, accounting 
for and legitimating Western societies’ decisions to go to war. The result has 
tended to be the “legalization” of the tradition […] – and also an attempt to 
create a just war theory […], to be used as a kind of moral slide-rule from 
which legitimate instances of the use of force can be read off whenever 
necessary.26  
                                                
24 Judith N. Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals, and Political Trials (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1986), 1. 
25 George Lucas, “Defense or Offense? The Two Streams of Just War Theory,” in War and Border 
Crossings: Ethics When Cultures Clash, ed. Peter A. French and Jason A. Short (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2005), 50. 
26 Rengger, “On the Just War Tradition in the Twenty-First Century,” 360. 
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The metaphor of the “moral slide-rule” is supposed to convey the impression that 
case-based reasoning has historically been superseded; in its place, a proper system of 
rules and principles asserted itself through a complicated series of developments, 
which eventually culminated in the creation of Just War theory in the more emphatic 
sense. As pointed out above, the main catalyst in these developments has been the rise 
of natural rights thinking, most prominently advanced by Grotius’ The Rights of War 
and Peace, which established the distinction between the rules of waging war (jus ad 
bellum) and the rules of warfare (jus in bello).27 As Alex Bellamy has persuasively 
demonstrated, Grotius’s legalism provided the philosophical foundations for the 
development of international law as well as for the subsequent ethical reflection on 
the use of force.28 
While it is, of course, important to acknowledge the diversity of views collected under 
the moniker “Just War theory” today, it is instructive to identify powerful trends. The 
“practical reasoning” approach to Just War has seen a remarkable revival in recent 
years, especially through the works of Paul Ramsey, Jean Bethke Elshtain and James 
Turner Johnson29; but these Augustinian positions remain slightly marginalized in 
                                                
27 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, ed. Richard Tuck (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005), 
393, 1186. On the transition to early modern Just War theory see: Mark Evans, “Moral Theory and the 
Idea of a Just War,” in Just War Theory: A Reappraisal, ed. Mark Evans (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005), 1–21. 
28 Bellamy, Just Wars, 8, 71–75. 
29 See representatively: Paul Ramsey, The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility 
(Lanham/Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002); Jean Bethke Elshtain, Augustine and the Limits of 
Politics (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995); James Turner Johnson, Morality & 
Contemporary Warfare (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999); Jean Bethke Elshtain, “Why 
Augustine? Why Now?,” Catholic University Law Review 52 (2003 2002): 283; James Turner Johnson, 
This is a pre-print/pre-proofread draft. 12 
contemporary academic discourse. Just War theory today is dominated by a paradigm 
that is much more aligned with Grotius’ rule-based approach than with Augustine.30 
What is more, the rule-based approach is typically promoted by those who have been 
“trained in the analytic tradition”31. Perhaps it might be overstated to call this 
approach the sole mainstream in the current debate, but it is not exaggerated to claim 
that it articulates a very influential position that has gained in visibility over the last 
decades. The following arguments will hence be directed at this specific stream within 
Just War theory. 
Theorists trained in the analytic tradition often conceive of Just War theory along the 
lines of lawlike precepts, without paying much attention to the complexity of real-
world issues. We can perceive this by looking at how empirical claims are generally 
treated in legalist Just War theory. Theorists proceed in different directions. The most 
common path is to first establish the principles and rules of a Just War in an ideal 
sense, and then apply those to specific cases. Here, we obviously find an engagement 
with the real world, but the account given of the cases is itself secondary to the 
                                                                                                                                      
Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical Inquiry (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1981). 
30 Possibly the most prominent author in the contemporary debate who has been trying to show, 
through a multi-volume project on the crimes prosecuted at Nuremberg, that both Just War theory and 
international in fact rest on the same Grotian foundations is Larry May. See his books: Crimes Against 
Humanity: A Normative Account (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); War Crimes and 
Just War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Aggression and Crimes Against Peace 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Genocide: A Normative Account (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
31 Jeff McMahan, “Rethinking the ‘Just War,’ Part 1,” http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com, 
Opinionator, November 11, 2012, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/11/rethinking-the-
just-war-part-1/. 
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development of principles and rules of a Just War. The focus on pre-established 
norms guarantees that the practice of casuistry is contained to a bare minimum. 
Judgment and interpretation have therefore not been entirely discarded in legalist Just 
War theory; indeed, they are indispensable for the application of abstract norms to 
particular cases. In Kantian terminology, this model is called “determinant” judgment, 
whereby given particulars are subsumed under a universal category. This model does 
not reject empirical claims about conflicts altogether, but they are relegated to a place 
where they do not have an impact on the rules and principles themselves. The 
influential work of so-called “revisionist” Just War theorists, who hope to overthrow 
the moral equality of combatants, illustrates this statement. Although these 
revisionists acknowledge the changing nature of warfare as one of the drivers behind 
their refutation of some jus in bello principles, it would be hard to deny that their 
discussions remain curiously anodyne in terms of engaging with actual conflicts.32 
We may contrast this approach with a more radical one in which legalism leads to an 
account that is completely devoid of any empirical claims. Accordingly, some 
proponents of Just War theory pursue the route of what I would dub “pure analytical 
construction”, where all the examples in the text are hypothetical or counterfactual.33 
                                                
32 I don’t believe it is necessary to provide extensive evidence to underscore this observation. I would 
invite a skeptic to look into McMahan’s writings for an illustration: McMahan, Killing in War; Jeff 
McMahan, “The Just Distribution of Harm Between Combatants and Noncombatants,” Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 38, no. 4 (2010): 342–79, doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2010.01196.x. Cécile Fabre’s 
approach is a notable exception to this general tendency, as she seems more convinced of the 
importance of historical examples for normative theorizing. (Fabre, Cosmopolitan War, 15.)  
33 For a systematic critique of the use of imaginary cases in ethics, see: Michael Davis, “Imaginary 
Cases in Ethics: A Critique,” International Journal of Applied Philosophy 26, no. 1 (2012): 1–17, 
doi:10.5840/ijap20122611. 
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In these idealizing approaches, we detect no real world cases at all anymore, only 
highly stylized “Baby Killer Nations”34, fictitious states like “Kazanistan”35, and 
otherworldly figures such as the “Innocent Aggressor”36. Without too much effort, we 
might be able to guess on which real-world countries or people these hypothetical or 
counterfactual examples are based – in fact, the parsimonious description of Rawls’s 
imaginary “Kazanistan” has been criticized for reproducing stereotypes about existing 
Muslim societies.37 The purpose of introducing fictional states or persons, though, is 
precisely to shield the theory from any contagion with impure reality. Far from being 
the exclusive privilege of philosophers residing in the ivory tower, this style of 
exploring the morality of war has found its way into military academies: the so-called 
“trolley problem”38, another famous thought experiment in ethics with endless 
                                                
34 F. M. Kamm, “Terrorism and Intending Evil,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 36, no. 2 (2008): 164, 
doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2008.00131.x.  
35 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples; With, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1999), 75–78.  
36 Michael Otsuka, “Killing the Innocent in Self-Defense,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 23, no. 1 
(1994): 74–94. 
37 Anne Norton, On the Muslim Question (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 94–117. 
38 The “trolley problem”, which by now has seen several formulations, seeks to examine the moral 
stringency of the distinction between doing and allowing harm. One of its best-known designs can be 
summarized in the following manner: “You’re standing by the side of a track when you see a runaway 
train hurtling toward you: clearly the brakes have failed. Ahead are five people, tied to the track. If you 
do nothing, the five will be run over and killed. Luckily you are next to a signal switch: turning this 
switch will send the out-of-control train down a side track, a spur, just ahead of you. Alas, there’s a 
snag: on the spur you spot one person tied to the track: changing direction will inevitably result in this 
person being killed. What should you do?” (David Edmonds, Would You Kill the Fat Man? The Trolley 
Problem and What Your Answer Tells Us About Right and Wrong, 2014, 183.) The original thought 
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variations, is nowadays firmly established on the mandatory Philosophy curriculum at 
West Point.39 
 
II.2 Problems with the “Moral Slide-Rule” 
What exactly is the problem with Just War theory as “moral slide-rule”, then? 
Nobody could reasonably deny that a slide-rule (and its modern descendant, the 
digital computer) is a convenient instrument for solving problems the human mind 
can barely master. But the same is not true for tackling quandaries such as the 
problem of when the time is right for a political or military initiative. In order to come 
to terms with these situations, we need something different than an algorithm, no 
matter how sophisticated and elegant its design is. Obviously, with regard to Just War 
theory, this does not imply that rules and principles are of no significance at all. Such 
a view would be self-defeating: How should we assess the justice of anything, if we 
had no rules and principles whatsoever at our disposal? 
Still, the metaphor of the “moral slide-rule” intimates that something has gone astray 
if a system of norms completely overshadows case-based reasoning. The problem 
with Just War theory as “moral slide-rule” is not so much that it is insufficiently 
refined to compute all the variables and dimensions involved in serious quandaries. 
                                                                                                                                      
experiment can be found in: Philippa Foot, “The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double 
Effect,” in Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford/New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 19–32; Judith Jarvis Thomson, “Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley 
Problem,” The Monist 59, no. 2 (1976): 204–17.  
39 David Edmonds, “Lessons in Morality at West Point,” BBC, September 18, 2010, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/9006784.stm; David Edmonds, “Matters of Life and Death,” Prospect 
Magazine, October 7, 2010, http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/ethics-trolley-
problem/#.Uh35zmSDSUY. 
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Rather, it is that legalist Just War theory confronts us with a skewed vision of 
morality, which lays excessive stress on the rules and principles, while minimizing 
case-based reasoning. When turning to a machine for help with difficult calculations, 
we sensibly expect it to come up with fast answers that are unequivocally correct. But 
such answers cannot be found in complex political realities.40 Therefore, in its drive to 
legalism, Just War theory promises more than it can keep – to render politics less 
messy, and to purify its muddy waters.41  
All this is not to say that the faculties of judgment and interpretation have completely 
disappeared from Just War theory as it is practiced today. They remain indispensable 
for applying rules and principles to the real world. Yet, many political theorists focus 
their energy on perfecting the algorithm of the “moral slide-rule”, instead of engaging 
with the complexity of real-world cases.42 Therefore, this paper merely proposes a re-
balancing of Just War theory such that the judging and interpreting of real-world 
                                                
40 C. A. J. Coady, Messy Morality: The Challenge of Politics, Uehiro Series in Practical Ethics 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
41 To render it somewhat more starkly: the “moral slide-rule” will be of comfort to those who cannot 
bear subscribing to a tragic vision of politics. On the relationship between tragedy and politics, see: 
Toni Erskine and Richard Ned Lebow, eds., Tragedy and International Relations (Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Richard Ned Lebow, The Tragic 
Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests, and Orders (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); 
Michael Neu, “The Tragedy of Justified War,” International Relations 27, no. 4 (2013): 461–80, 
doi:10.1177/0047117813483434. 
42 In an excellent analysis of Just War theory’s usefulness for understanding counterterrorism measures, 
Neta Crawford makes exactly the same point when she writes: “Ethical traditions are not checklists or 
simple codes of conduct – they are tools for evaluating options and assessing behavior. As such, the 
questions that an ethical tradition raises may not have clear and simple answers. ” (Neta C. Crawford, 
“Just War Theory and the U.S. Counterterror War,” Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 1 (2003): 21.) 
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cases operate on an equal par with the elaborating on rules and principles. The 
suggestion is not to dismiss rules and principles altogether, but rather to invite 
political theorists to grapple more directly with particular cases. Whereas yearning for 
the (presumably) golden age of casuistry would be illusionary, practical reasoning has 
in the contemporary debate become sidelined to such a degree that the plea for more 
engagement with conflicts in the real world is more urgent than ever. This call for 
case-based reasoning echoes and hopefully amplifies analogous critiques in other 
corners of the academic community: constructivist International Relations scholars, 
for example, have recently postulated the emergence of a “practice turn” in their 
discipline.43 Similarly, the aforementioned adherents of the Augustinian strand in Just 
War theory have been skeptical of the analytical constructions in the legalist 
mainstream.44 
                                                
43 Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, “International Practices,” International Theory 3, no. 01 (2011): 
1–36, doi:10.1017/S175297191000031X; Chris Brown, “The ‘Practice Turn’, Phronesis and Classical 
Realism: Towards a Phronetic International Political Theory?,” Millennium - Journal of International 
Studies 40, no. 3 (2012): 439–56, doi:10.1177/0305829812441893; Vincent Pouliot, “‘Sobjectivism’: 
Toward a Constructivist Methodology,” International Studies Quarterly 51, no. 2 (2007): 359–84, 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2007.00455.x. 
44 James Turner Johnson nicely captures his vision of Just War theory when he writes: “Implicit in all 
that I have been saying thus far is a rejection of yet another conception: that just war tradition has only 
to do with ideas and thus is abstractly remote from real-world circumstances, which require not ideas 
but actions. This is far from the truth. Just war tradition represents above all a fund of practical moral 
wisdom, based not in abstract speculation or theorization, but in reflection on actual problems 
encountered in war as these have presented themselves in different historical circumstances.” (James 
Turner Johnson, Can Modern War Be Just? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 15.) On Jean 
Bethke Elshtain’s move away from legalism, see: O’Driscoll, The Renegotiation of the Just War 
Tradition and the Right to War in the Twenty-First Century, 102. 
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Inspired by these suggestions, the final section will propose “pragmatic fallibilism” as 
a framework for thinking through time in warfare. Before delineating this alternative 
vision, however, let us examine the impact legalism has on the treatment of time. The 
shift away from casuistic moral arguments makes it difficult to treat decisions over 
timing in as subtle a way as they deserve. This is so because any contentious issue 
about whether the time for an initiative is, or is not, right becomes quickly absorbed 
by the “moral slide-rule”. By this I mean that a legalist understanding of the justice of 
warfare leads to the belief that decisions over the resort to force can be undertaken 
straightforwardly: by simply looking at the rules and principles that constitute the 
moral core of mainstream Just War theory. Just War theory in its currently dominant 
configuration operates on a simplistic understanding of time, and on an inflated 
appreciation of rules and principles. The main problem is hence that it conflates all 
issues of timing with chronos, without giving proper concern to kairos – a distinction 
the next section will elaborate on in more detail. This is an omission that can be 
remedied by adjusting Just War theory’s focus on rules and principles. Relinquishing 
the “moral slide-rule” certainly has the consequence that we abandon the ambition to 
allay doubts about timing once and for all. An excessive stress on analytical 
construction, as it is prevalent in some circles of moral philosophy, distracts us from 
the task of appraising the various factors that need to be accounted for if Just War 
theory is to play a role at all in critically evaluating warfare. Neglecting this task is a 
mistake. If Just War theory hopes to have any practical impact at all, it needs to widen 
its arsenal of criteria for the permissible use of force. The motive for this broadening 
of the horizon is that casuistic reasoning crucially depends on the “refined capacity to 
discern the morally relevant similarities and differences between cases”45. These 
                                                
45 Jonsen and Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry, 151. 
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factors comprise not only the traditional provisions of jus ad bellum, jus in bello and 
jus post bellum, which continue to be pivotal for the normative assessment of warfare; 
they also cover more mundane issues, such as reviewing material resources, garnering 
popular support, establishing which rights and interests are being threatened or 
violated, and analyzing the potential enemy’s resources and morale. 
All these issues are intimately connected to questions of timing. In the paper’s final 
section I will hone in on this connection by looking at three examples of real-world 
conflicts and their repercussions. Due to its stress on lawlike precepts, Just War 
theory of the legalist variety fails to account for the complex ways in which time 
structures action. This dimension of political time, which the next section will explore 
in detail, profoundly affects the normative assessment of warfare. Re-balancing Just 
War theory therefore implies that we pay closer attention to the empirical 
circumstances of justice. Unless these circumstances are included in the normative 
assessment of warfare, our thinking will remain hampered by a one-dimensional grasp 
of the conditions under which political and military initiatives can gain legitimacy. 
 
III. Chronos and Kairos 
I will take as a starting point for the upcoming reflections the ancient Greek and then 
Roman distinction between two kinds of time: chronos and kairos. Scholars of 
classical rhetoric have devoted extensive commentaries to this distinction.46 In 
                                                
46 Michael Carter, “Stasis and Kairos: Principles of Social Construction in Classical Rhetoric,” 
Rhetoric Review 7, no. 1 (1988): 97–112, doi:10.2307/465537; Phillip Sipiora and James S. Baumlin, 
eds., Rhetoric and Kairos: Essays in History, Theory, and Praxis (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 2002); John R. Wilson, “Kairos as ‘Due Measure,’” Glotta 58, no. 3/4 (1980): 177–204, 
doi:10.2307/40266516. The edited volume by Sipiora and Baumlin also includes an extensive 
bibliography on the research on kairos. For an informative philological study see: Manfred Kerkhoff, 
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Christian theology kairos occupies a prominent place as well: the standard Greek 
translation of “appropriate time” in the Septuagint refers to kairos, and not to 
chronos.47 Furthermore, modern theologians have tried to recover the potential of 
kairos for contemporary debates. Among the most influential appropriations of kairos 
in 20th Century political theology is Paul Tillich’s Protestant existentialism.48 Tillich’s 
multi-faceted interpretation of kairos as an exceptional moment of individual and 
societal transformation is relevant for this paper insofar as his writings had significant 
impact on the intellectual development of classical realist thinkers, such as Reinhold 
Niebuhr. Whereas this influence is in itself noteworthy, these thinkers, whose 
positions have been informed by political theology in general, and not only by 
Tillich’s Protestant existentialism – from Hans Morgenthau to George Kennan – did 
not explicitly refer to the distinction between chronos and kairos.49 
                                                                                                                                      
“Zum antiken Begriff des Kairos,” Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 27, no. 2 (1973): 256–74, 
doi:10.2307/40279616. On kairos in Aristotle’s rhetorical and ethical works see: James L. Kinneavy 
and Catherine R. Eskin, “Kairos in Aristotle’s Rhetoric,” Written Communication 11, no. 1 (1994): 
131–42, doi:10.1177/0741088394011001006. 
47 John E. Smith, “Time, Times, and the ‘Right Time’; Chronos and Kairos,” The Monist 53, no. 1 
(1969): 9. 
48 Tillich published several books on this topic, and conceives of kairos in an eschatological vein. On 
this reading of the New Testament, kairos is closely linked to Christ’s coming to the world. See: 
Andrew O’Neill, Tillich: A Guide for the Perplexed (London/New York: T & T Clark, 2008), 15–9, 24, 
69, 75–9. For an analyis of Tillich’s notion of kairos against the backdrop of his systematic theology 
see: Oswald Bayer, “Tillich as a Systematic Theologian,” in The Cambridge Companion to Paul 
Tillich, ed. Russell Re Manning (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 18–19, 
32.  
49 Space constraints prevent me from further exploring this illuminating link further. On the intricate 
connections between 20th Century political theology and IR theory, see: Nicolas Guilhot, “American 
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This is why it appears vital to revisit the ancient roots of the distinction.50 In modern 
English language use, we tend to collapse these two conceptions of time into one 
word, but the Greeks drew a line between chronos and kairos by using two words for 
two distinct phenomena. Some of the hermeneutic difficulties with our attempts to 
grasp the meaning of kairos can be explained by the obvious fact that the distinction 
seems rather artificial to us. We use one word and add adjectives to specify it, for 
instance when we speak of the “right time” for an action. But in ancient Greek culture 
chronos and kairos referred to singular kinds of time in the most natural way. When 
reconstructing the notion of kairos we will therefore have to keep in mind that what 
might perhaps seem contrived to modern language users has been unproblematic and 
                                                                                                                                      
Katechon: When Political Theology Became International Relations Theory,” Constellations 17, no. 2 
(2010): 224–53, doi:10.1111/j.1467-8675.2010.00586.x; Jodok Troy, ed., Religion and the Realist 
Tradition: From Political Theology to International Relations Theory and Back, 2014; Vassilios 
Paipais, “Necessary Fiction: Realism’s Tragic Theology,” International Politics 50, no. 6 (2013): 846–
62, doi:10.1057/ip.2013.38. On the relationship between Tillich and Niebuhr see: Ronald Stone, 
“Tillich and Niebuhr as Allied Public Theologians,” Political Theology 9, no. 4 (2008): 503–11. On 
Niebuhr’s peculiar version of Christian Realism see: Robin W. Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian 
Realism (Cambridge/NewYork: Cambridge University Press, 1995); John Marsden, “Reinhold Niebuhr 
and the Ethics of Christian Realism,” International Journal of Public Theology 4, no. 4 (2010): 483–
501, doi:10.1163/156973210X526445. On Niebuhr’s wider impact, see: Daniel F. Rice, Reinhold 
Niebuhr and His Circle of Influence (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
50 At this point a clarification might seem necessary: Although I turn to ancient philosophy and culture 
to recuperate this complex notion of time, I shall not advocate an analogous turn to ancient Just War 
theory. The reason for my reluctance is simple: while it might be possible to trace the deeper origins of 
Just War theory back to thinkers such as Thucydides and Cicero, the lessons we may draw from these 
thinkers strike me as altogether too thin to be of substantive value for the contemporary debate. See 
Gregory M. Reichberg, Henrik Syse, and Endre Begby, eds., The Ethics of War: Classic and 
Contemporary Readings (Malden/Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 1–90. 
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ordinary in its original cultural context. For our purpose, it suffices to highlight the 
following aspects, through which the Greeks distinguished chronos and kairos: 
One term – chronos – expresses the fundamental conception of time as 
measure, the quantity of duration, the length of periodicity, the age of an 
object or artefact […]. The questions relevant to this conception of time are: 
“How fast?”, “How frequent?”, “How old?” and the answers to these 
questions can be given, in principle at least, in cardinal numbers or in terms of 
limits that approach these numbers. The other term – kairos - points to a 
qualitative character of time, to the special position an event or action 
occupies in a series […]. The question especially relevant to kairos time is 
“When?”, “At what time?”. Kairos, or the “right time”, as the term is often 
translated, involves ordinality or the conception of a special temporal position 
[…].51  
Smith’s evocative comparison between cardinal and ordinal numbers is meant to 
underscore the observation that the opportune moment is special in that it is always 
inserted in a sequence of events. Just like ordinal numbers, the opportune moment can 
only be grasped relative to previous and future points in time. Chronos, on the other 
hand, can be associated with cardinal numbers insofar as we use these to simply 
establish quantities, through counting for example. The distinction between chronos 
and kairos can hence be read as an attempt to parse normal, measurable time from 
qualitative, actionable time.  
                                                
51 Smith, “Time, Times, and the ‘Right Time’; Chronos and Kairos,” 1–2. 
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Smith isolates three essential tenets that set kairos apart from chronos.52 Firstly, 
mentioning kairos indicates that there is a “right time” for action, as opposed to any 
possible time. When analyzing the bad timing of a political actor’s initiative, we 
implicitly touch on this dimension of kairos. Secondly, kairos denotes that a critical 
point, a parting of the ways, has been reached. This means that a decision about an 
initiative cannot be longer postponed: one must take a stand and choose a direction to 
proceed. Thirdly, kairos opens up the proverbial window of opportunity for 
extraordinary action that would otherwise be impossible to undertake. Moments of 
crisis are also exceptional occasions for change. 
More needs to be said about the relation between chronos and kairos. Sometimes the 
line separating these two conceptions of time is drawn too sharply, as if actually 
happening events and their interpretation could always be treated independently from 
each other. Such a contrast between chronos and kairos is unnecessarily stark. Any 
comprehensive reflection on kairos would have to acknowledge that seizing the 
opportune moment always hinges on a sober evaluation of the objective context in 
which action is taken.53 Hence, the goal is not to replace a focus on chronos with an 
emphasis on kairos, but rather to delineate a more complete image of political time by 
bringing practical reasoning to bear on both the chronotic and the kairotic dimensions 
of human affairs. 
To what extent does this complex conception of time capture something about 
political action more specifically? There are two respects in which kairos can be 
                                                
52 John E. Smith, “Time and Qualitative Time,” The Review of Metaphysics 40, no. 1 (1986): 10–11, 
doi:10.2307/20128415. 
53 Amélie Frost Benedikt, “On Doing the Right Thing at the Right Time: Toward an Ethics of Kairos,” 
in Rhetoric and Kairos: Essays in History, Theory, and Praxis, ed. Phillip Sipiora and James S. 
Baumlin (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), 226–35. 
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understood to bear on political action: (1) On the one hand, kairos may serve as a 
reminder that political action – that is, action in consort with others – always remains 
conditioned by temporality. The timing of initiatives under permanently changing 
circumstances is obviously important for political actors, if they want their policies to 
be successful. Taking advantage of the opportunity structure is thus a crucial skill for 
political actors to acquire. Another such skill encompasses the control of political 
time. Only in fictional scenarios are political questions debated as if there was no time 
limit to deliberations.54 In the real world, the setting of priorities – which topic should 
be debated first and which last? – makes a massive difference in concrete decisions.55 
Furthermore, the emphasis on kairos points to the fact that political actors often need 
to take decisions under circumstances of radical uncertainty: they must cultivate the 
ability to make predictions about possible outcomes before they launch a political or 
military initiative. 
(2) On the other hand, kairos can helps us make sense of the relation between 
timeliness and critique. One danger with linking political action to kairos is that the 
skilled political actor then finds herself in the strategic position to brand any critique 
of her initiatives as “untimely”. It is a common phenomenon in public debates that 
                                                
54 It would be a caricature to present contemporary defenders of deliberative democracy as being 
unaware of the constraints of temporality. In fact, some of the most relevant innovations in deliberative 
democracy – such as the use of polling – have their origin in the recognition that citizens experience 
time as scarce and might thus not be able or willing to devote much energy to deliberations. See: James 
Bohman, “Survey Article: The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy,” Journal of Political 
Philosophy 6, no. 4 (1998): 400–425, doi:10.1111/1467-9760.00061; James S. Fishkin, When the 
People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009). 
55 Raymond Geuss, Philosophy and Real Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 31–32.  
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minority positions are delegitimized by asserting that “now is not the time” for 
dissent. Critique is thus discarded as inopportune or even pernicious. There is, in fact, 
no better context to elucidate this observation than debates over warfare. In 
preparation of and during war, critics are regularly stigmatized as unpatriotic, 
dangerous and subversive. Insofar as political action extends to the control of time – 
through the regulation of priorities and the exploitation of opportunity structures – 
abuse is always a danger, to which critics need to remain alert.56  
Political actors are thus to be held accountable for their predictions about an 
initiative’s possible outcomes. Since the distinction between chronos and kairos 
indicates that any decision about an initiative occurs in an environment of radical 
uncertainty, political actors are under an obligation to include in their predictions as 
many factors as can reasonably be expected, some of which have been outlined in 
section II. To check whether they indeed comply with this “duty of diligence” is the 
very goal of critique. Assuming a critical posture in debates over timing in war 
therefore implies that the justifications for a military or political initiative offered by 
political actors are viewed with great suspicion.  
Kimberly Hutchings develops a wide-ranging theory of kairos, and its relevance for 
political action, that significantly diverges from the account defended above. In her 
book Time and World Politics, Hutchings explores how “assumptions about time 
enter into the analysis and judgment of world politics”57. One of her main 
                                                
56 For two excellent reflections on the relation between timeliness and critique see: Wendy Brown, 
Edgework: Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); 
Samuel Allen Chambers, Untimely Politics, Taking on the Political (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2003). 
57 Kimberly Hutchings, Time and World Politics: Thinking the Present (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2008), 20. 
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observations is that theorists in the Western tradition – from Machiavelli onwards – 
typically associate political action with the ability to mobilize the “powers of kairos to 
regulate, control and transform seasonal or clock time into something different”58. 
This understanding of political action cuts across various ideological traditions. 
Hutchings convincingly demonstrates that, despite their massive differences, liberal 
defenders of democratic peace, post-Kantians as well as post-Marxist philosophers all 
rely on broadly comparable notions of “world-political time”. 
In her critical response, Hutchings strives to distance herself from the conventional 
equation of political action with the regulation, control and transformation of time. 
Her rival conceptualization is premised on the idea of “heterotemporality”59. Through 
this neologism, Hutchings attempts to delineate a radical alternative to dealing with 
political time, which “acknowledges multiple temporal orderings and the ways in 
which they contingently impinge on each other. It rejects accounts of political time 
that see it in unified or unifying terms, or as transcendentally conditioned by some 
kairotic power.”60 In sum, Hutchings hopes to emancipate political theory from its 
unhealthy obsession with kairos so that it gets more sensitive to the “sheer volatilty 
and unpredictability of temporal becoming”61. 
Although there can be little doubt that Time and World Politics presents us with the 
most elaborate interpretation of “world-political time” to date, it might be worthwhile 
                                                
58 Ibid., 158. 
59 Proponents of postcolonial studies have in fact created the notion of “heterotemporality” so as to 
come to terms with the histories of subaltern peoples. See: Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing 
Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference, 2nd ed. (Princeton/Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2008). 
60 Hutchings, Time and World Politics, 175. 
61 Ibid., 174. 
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to interrogate its suitability for grappling with the normative questions of Just War 
theory. While Hutchings gestures towards the potential of her heterotemporal 
approach to generate a new kind of normativity, it is not entirely clear what would be 
gained if we gave up on the idea that political action is, amongst other things, about 
regulating, controlling and transforming time. As this section has argued, a focus on 
kairos enables us to exercise critique insofar as the decisions of political actors come 
under scrutiny. It remains vague, though, how the heterotemporal approach may 
fulfill this task. Assuming that critique is a central tenet of Just War theory, it would 
therefore be sensible to keep with the notion of kairos and resist the temptation, pace 
Hutchings, to radically recast the way in which time matters for politics. 
 
IV. Resetting Time In Just War Theory 
Section II unfolded a narrative of legalist Just War theory as leaning towards rules 
and principles. This orientation, I have suggested, pushes considerations of time 
beyond the theory’s normative purview because time is perceived purely in terms of a 
measure – the element of kairos is hence completely ignored. One effect of this 
misbalance is that legalist Just War theory remains ill-equipped to uncover attempts at 
manipulating time. The preponderance of generality and abstractness in contemporary 
Just War theory has a negative effect on the theory’s critical capacity. A recent 
empirical study has exposed how the consistent framing of an attack as justified can 
assist liberal states, such as the US in particular, to sell “the decision to go to war to 
the domestic audience”62. This kind of cooptation of Just War theory can at least 
                                                
62 Michael J. Butler, Selling a “Just” War: Framing, Legitimacy, and US Military Intervention 
(Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 11. For similar 
critiques see: Anthony Burke, “Just War or Ethical Peace? Moral Discourses of Strategic Violence 
This is a pre-print/pre-proofread draft. 28 
partly be blamed on its inclination to favor rules and principles over the examination 
of real-world cases, because political actors will have easy play to cloak their interests 
in terms of generic and abstract values if little attention is paid to the context in which 
a war is waged. Critics in particular are therefore well advised to embrace case-based 
reasoning if they wish to hold political actors accountable for their decisions.63 
 
IV.1. Three Examples 
So far I have praised the virtues of interpretation and judgment, but I have not yet 
specified how they operate and how they relate to the complex conception of time 
described in the section III. To flesh out the point I wish to make, consider the 
following three cases. Crucially, these examples are not meant to close the discussion 
about what has been going on in these contexts. Rather, their aim is to rehearse 
pertinent episodes, in which it became evident that timing is fundamental to the 
assessment of political and military initiatives. In particular, they will show that a 
simplistic understanding of time as chronos alone is detrimental to Just War theory’s 
critical mission. 
The first episode is connected to jus ad bellum, and entails the by now well-known 
build-up to the Gulf War in 1991. Through the condition of “last resort”, Just War 
theory postulates that going to war can only be justified once – other things being 
                                                                                                                                      
After 9/11,” International Affairs 80, no. 2 (2004): 329–53, doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2004.00386.x; 
Jon Western, “The War over Iraq: Selling War to the American Public,” Security Studies 14, no. 1 
(2005): 106–39, doi:10.1080/09636410591002518. 
63 On the nexus between judgment and critique see: Nicholas Rengger, “The Judgment of War: On the 
Idea of Legitimate Force in World Politics,” Review of International Studies 31, no. Supplement S1 
(2005): 160, doi:10.1017/S0260210505006832. 
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equal – all the channels of non-violent conflict resolution have been fully exhausted.64 
The purpose of this norm is to restrain the state’s inclination to prematurely wage war 
when faced with minor provocations. Here, Michael Walzer’s approach offers an 
illuminating angle on the Gulf War in 1991. Whereas he treats the meaning of “last 
resort” only superficially in Just and Unjust Wars65, in a later collection of essays 
called Arguing about War Walzer dedicates more space to this issue. In a subsection 
of this book entitled “Cases”, he asks whether the US-led confrontation was indeed 
triggered in conformity with the “last resort” clause: 
Taken literally […] “last resort” would make war morally impossible. For we 
can never reach lastness, or we can never know that we have reached it. There 
is always something else to do: another diplomatic note, another United 
Nations resolution, another meeting. Once something like a blockade is in 
place, it is always possible to wait a little longer and hope for the success of 
[…] nonviolence. […] But sending troops into battle commonly brings with it 
so many unanticipated costs that it has come to represent a moral threshold: 
political leaders must cross this threshold only with great reluctance and 
trepidation.66  
In this interpretation of the principle of “last resort”, Walzer stresses its cautionary 
effect. In claiming that “great reluctance and trepidation” must restrain political actors 
when launching an attack, Walzer implicitly formulates an important criterion of 
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critique for Just War theory: that overhasty and reckless maneuvers will necessarily 
lead to unjust wars. The abstract norm of “last resort” must therefore be subjected to a 
process of judgment and interpretation in order to specify whether political actors 
have indeed surpassed the “moral threshold” enshrined in the principle. Walzer makes 
it clear that dispensing with a “metaphysical”67 notion of lastness requires us to 
engage in case-based reasoning, otherwise the indeterminacy of “last resort” can 
easily turn into a facile excuse for standing by and for doing nothing. This implies 
that the sequence of events, which precede and succeed the use of force, have to come 
under scrutiny. In spite of the availability of further peaceful means, Walzer claims 
that in 1991 the war was indeed legitimate because the prior blockade of Iraq did not 
trigger Saddam Hussein’s downfall. While the economic sanctions, which had been in 
place since the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, could thus have easily been extended, 
they proved toothless in this particular situation.68 In other words, Walzer maintains 
that peaceful means could undoubtedly have been employed over a sustained period, 
but they would not have had the desired effect of dismantling the regime. It is vital to 
see that such a kairotic assessment is an eminently critical exercise. It depends on the 
specificity of the examined case whether enough has been done to avoid a war. By 
contrast, consider Walzer’s position on the invasion of Iraq in 2003: here he argues 
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that the goal of dismantling Iraq “could almost certainly have achieved with measures 
short of full-scale war”69. 
The second episode is linked to jus in bello, and refers to Israel’s Operation Cast Lead 
in 2008/2009. One of the foundational rules and principles of Just War theory 
stipulates non-combatant, i.e. civilian, immunity.70 The idea behind this norm is clear: 
non-combatants must be safe from any form of military aggression because they are 
not actively or directly engaged in warfare. This protection, however, does not apply 
in the case of “collateral damage” (as it is often euphemistically called), when a strike 
aims at a military target, but also harms non-combatants. Such collateral damage is 
covered by the doctrine of double effect, which implies a distinction between an act’s 
intended and its foreseen consequences.71 Any soldier who might cause collateral 
damage by foreseeably, but not intentionally killing civilians – for instance by 
targeting a hostile facility that is close to a hospital or a school – is under an 
obligation of care: he or she must attempt as much as possible to avoid casualties. 
But these moral and legal categories are themselves conditioned by time constraints, 
because soldiers and their commanders act under immense pressure in the battlefield. 
Therefore, the crucial question is how much risk for their own lives combatants must 
shoulder when taking precautions to protect non-combatants from harm. In assessing 
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whether soldiers and their commanders exhibited negligence, recklessness or due care 
in their risky conduct, time constraints play a crucial role.72 
To illuminate this observation, consider the policy of Israel’s army during the Gaza 
War in 2008/2009 to warn civilians whose houses were in the proximity of a military 
target, through leaflets and phone calls, that the area where they lived would soon be 
attacked.73 According to one of the champions of this policy, more than 150.000 such 
phone calls were made over the three weeks of Operation Cast Lead.74 Recent attacks 
on military targets in Gaza were also preceded by phone calls from the Israel Defense 
Forces (IDF), which gave the civilian inhabitants only five minutes to leave their 
homes before they would be destroyed.75 As one commentator remarked, “[b]y giving 
residents the choice between death and expulsion, […] one phone-call turns ‘non-
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combatants’ into ‘human shields’”76. The need to consistently distinguish between 
combatants and non-combatants was thus translated into a chronotic question: giving 
civilians five minutes to leave is an extremely coarse-grained rubric to establish a 
resident’s status as a combatant. 
In reaction to propositions that Israel’s army had complied with the norm of non-
combatant immunity during the Gaza war, Avishai Margalit and Michael Walzer 
argue that such measures as dropping leaflets or making phone calls do not add up to 
an adequate standard of care concerning the protection of civilians.77 A hurried 
notification of an impending attack is not sufficient to ensure that civilians will be 
spared from violence. What would have been necessary is, at the very least, to 
ascertain that non-combatants have indeed cleared the area on which a strike would be 
launched.78 Does this mean that soldiers and their commanders have an infinitely 
demanding obligation of care in avoiding “collateral damage”? Margalit and Walzer 
respond that this is not so – combatants are not required to take “suicidal risks” in 
eliminating the possibility of accidentally killing civilians. This would render warfare 
altogether impossible. But an examination of Israel’s policy during the Gaza War 
demonstrates that in this particular case not enough precaution was taken. Indeed, the 
leaflets and phone calls ahead of the Israeli strikes had the sole purpose of devising a 
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normalized procedure to guarantee that any civilian casualties would appear to be the 
regrettable result of “collateral damage”. The five-minutes warnings are therefore a 
good illustration of the dangers of the “moral slide-rule” when it is applied in a 
concrete conflict. What the distinction between combatants and non-combatants in 
reality requires is a careful contextual analysis of the minimal risks soldiers and their 
commanders ought to take in the battlefield.79 The IDF’s approach to avoiding civilian 
casualties thus highlights what happens when judgment and interpretation are 
substituted by an extremely coarse-grained rubric, generated by Just War Theory’s 
“moral slide-rule”. 
The third episode relates to jus post bellum, and involves the case levelled against 
Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 
2009.80 To this date, Al-Bashir’s case represents the only incident where the ICC has 
indicted a sitting head of state, thereby annulling his right to immunity. Its then chief 
prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, issued an arrest warrant for war crimes, genocide 
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and crimes against humanity, allegedly committed in 2003.81 Although the arrest 
warrant has until now not been executed, it stands to reason that the ICC’s indictment 
exerted a profound impact on international criminal justice around the globe.82 The 
tribunal’s actions continue to affect in particular the prospects of lasting peace in post-
conflict societies on the African continent. 
Several analysts have remarked that the ICC’s charge remained caught between a 
dilemma that has long been recognized and debated in the literature on transitional 
justice: peace v. justice.83 Critics have accused the prosecutor’s strategy of “human 
rights fundamentalism”84, essentially contending that the tribunal’s quest for 
retributive justice destabilized projects of political reform in Africa. These critics 
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have also submitted that the ICC acted in an irresponsible manner as it completely 
ignored the timing of its initiative.85 By issuing the arrest warrant in a very volatile 
environment, Ocampo jeopardized diplomatic efforts to end the humanitarian crisis in 
Darfur. 
Scrutinizing this episode against the backdrop of a complex conception of time, it 
becomes evident that the ICC largely ignored the kairotic dimension of its 
prosecutorial ambitions. While Ocampo clearly hoped to increase the ICC’s 
deterrence power, he chose to disregard the wider implications of his actions by 
insisting on its impartial and independent mandate. The ICC’s “judicial 
romanticism”86 – its deliberate ignorance of the context in which it operates – may 
therefore block the road to peace when indictments occur at inauspicious junctures. 
Peace is not necessarily and always advanced by international criminal justice; it may 
even be undermined if the time for its pursuit is not right. Establishing whether the 
time for prosecutions has arrived is a challenge that can only be tackled if we weigh 
the good of retributive justice against other goods, such as the preservation of peace. 
This emphasis on the kairos of retributive justice projects is, of course, not to say that 
former perpetrators should enjoy impunity forever. The indictment of Al-Bashir 
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merely serves as an illustration of the fact that the timing of trials as a mechanism of 
securing jus post bellum calls for a subtle investigation into a great variety of 
factors.87 Ultimately, the goal in these trials must be to craft a compromise between a 
search for retributive justice measures and prudential considerations about the timing 
and scope of these measures.88 
These remarks on the timing of prosecutions by the ICC are not intended to unearth a 
structural flaw in all mechanisms of international justice. The ICC itself certainly 
suffers from a number of grave shortcomings, ranging from its unfortunate perception 
as a vehicle of “legal colonialism” on the African continent, to its lack of support 
from powerful nations such as the USA, China and Russia.89 These criticisms 
notwithstanding, there have recently been signs, in particular in the Kenya case, that 
the ICC may be obliged to change course with regard to its prosecutorial ambitions.90 
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Therefore, it is conceivable that an adjustment in the ICC’s institutional culture might 
lead to a better balance between principle and pragmatism in international justice. 
These three examples demonstrate that many of the provisions in Just War theory 
about time constraints remain underdetermined in their generality and abstractness. 
There is nothing in the principle of “last resort” that would define per se when all 
means of non-violent conflict resolution have been exhausted – only a case-based 
analysis of the events and of the efficacy of peaceful measures preceding the use of 
force can establish whether resorting to war is legitimate. Similarly, it is impossible to 
determine the level of risk soldiers and their commanders must take in protecting 
civilians, without looking closely at the specificity of the conflict on the ground – a 
normalized procedure to separate civilians from combatants, such as the IDF’s five-
minutes warnings, is likely to conceal the true extent of collateral damage, instead of 
protecting non-combatant immunity. Finally, the imperative to prosecute perpetrators 
of mass atrocity cannot be seen in isolation from other objectives, such as the 
preservation of peace – when it is safe to pursue justice thus becomes a matter of 
trading off various incommensurable goods. 
 
IV.2. Towards an Integrative Framework: The Pragmatist Ethos 
In the introduction, I have maintained that the purpose of this paper is recalibrating 
Just War’s emphasis on rules and principles. What is the most suitable framework for 
such an endeavour? I should start by underscoring that my concluding remarks will 
not culminate in a perfectly drawn picture of an alternative to legalism; rather, they 
will offer a rough, yet hopefully precise sketch of the alternative’s contours. A 
promising step towards such a sketch would be to mobilize some of the key 
characteristics of the pragmatist ethos so as to render judgment and interpretation in 
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war more effective. This ethos would allow Just War theory to once again sharpen its 
critical edge by emphasizing that an acknowledgment of the fallibility of judgment is 
compatible with the defence of firm convictions. Although it is notoriously difficult to 
define pragmatism as a coherent movement, I wish to draw on the political-theoretical 
dimension of this tradition in Anglo-American philosophy for a specific reason: 
classical, as well as contemporary, pragmatists stress the importance of experience for 
the development of theoretical positions. Pragmatism – in the wider sense, going 
beyond the historical founding figures of James, Peirce and Dewey – examines the 
many ways in which we share and construct the social world.91 Following Richard 
Bernstein’s characterization of the pragmatist ethos, we may isolate five distinct ideas 
shared by all pragmatists:92 a) anti-foundationalism, i.e. the idea that beliefs have no 
firm footing in transcendental certainty; b) fallibilism, i.e. the idea that all knowledge 
is open to further inquiry and critique; c) the necessity of a critical community, i.e. the 
idea that the self has a social character, d) an awareness of contingency, i.e. the idea 
that philosophy cannot fully master the world as an “open universe”, and e) plurality, 
i.e. the idea that there is always a multiplicity of traditions, from which no human 
being can escape. Applied to our topic, we might infer that pragmatic fallibilism 
envisages decisions over timing in warfare as positions that must ultimately remain 
open to further inquiry and critique. Political actors often have a vested interest in 
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closing the horizon for inquiry and critique such that their decisions appear 
incontestable. In response to this tendency, Just War theory should aim at vigorously 
and vociferously questioning these decisions. Those who subscribe to the premises of 
pragmatic fallibilism have the advantage of offering a normatively satisfying response 
to this challenge. Pragmatism is especially apt as a framework for thinking through 
time in warfare because it combines fallibilism with anti-skepticism.93 While all 
decisions about timing must remain open to further revisions, this general disposition 
does not lead to relativism of the sort that all decisions are equally justified. Rather, 
pragmatists foreground the notion of a “critical community” of inquirers that strives 
to hold political actors accountable for their words and deeds. It is this dual 
commitment to a fallibilistic mentality and a vehement rejection of relativism that 
reveals an advantage over the legalist framework outlined in section II. Whereas Just 
War Theory of the legalist variety promises more than it can keep, Just War Theory in 
a pragmatist vein strikes a balance between the judging and interpreting of real-world 
cases and the elaborating on rules and principles. Since case-based reasoning is 
ultimately reliant on the capacity to discern highly contentious situations, these ideas, 
which together form the basis for a pragmatist ethos, seem suitable for resisting the 
“tyranny of principles”94. 
Bernstein rightly underlines that pragmatists have for a long time been accused of 
lacking the stamina to stand up for the values they uphold. Critics regularly accuse 
pragmatists of being too feeble and flexible in their convictions – a flaw that becomes 
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particularly virulent in times of warfare, when unbending commitments to certain 
values are needed. However, Bernstein objects to this deprecating depiction of 
pragmatism that it misconstrues the nature of those commitments that are compatible 
with pragmatic fallibilism. Drawing on the philosophy of Sidney Hook, he asserts that 
the very idea of pragmatic fallibilism is embedded in a “tragic sense of life”95. This is 
how Bernstein sums up his view: 
We not only have to make difficult choices, but […] we are frequently faced 
with moral and political dilemmas where there are incompatible and 
irreconcilable values. This is precisely why pragmatists place so much 
emphasis on deliberation, inquiry, and the careful evaluation of consequences 
of our decisions and actions. […] It is a misleading caricature of the pragmatic 
mentality to suggest it calls for endless debate. It is difficult to think of another 
philosophical orientation that has placed so much emphasis on conduct, 
practice, and action. There is no incompatibility between being decisive and 
recognizing the fallibility and limitations of our choices and decisions. On the 
contrary, this is what is required for responsible action.96  
Therefore, pragmatic fallibilism is not pacifist in an absolute sense: it allows for 
commitments to be strong enough to justify the decision to use violence, so long as 
these commitments are the result of as much “deliberation, inquiry, and the careful 
evaluation of consequences of our decisions and actions” as possible. Regarding our 
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topic, this means that decisiveness about one’s convictions must be paired with 
alertness to the manipulability of political time. Here, the notion of pragmatic 
fallibilism can offer guidance as to what should be done. This does not mean that 
pragmatic fallibilism will establish the substantial outcome of processes of judgment 
and interpretation. However, it may provide an integrative framework for grappling 
with timing. Principles and rules will naturally play a part in this; but they are only the 
beginning, not the end of any cogent reflection on the permissible use of force. As the 
tentative discussion of the three case studies above has shown, there is ultimately no 
way around a careful contextual analysis of a great variety of factors that impinge on 
the justice of warfare. In this respect, again, Just War Theory in a pragmatist vein 
differs significantly from its legalist competitor. 
To restate the main points I have ventured to defend: this paper has not intimated that 
we should discount the project of normatively assessing warfare altogether. Rather, it 
has maintained that a thorough engagement with the empirical circumstances of 
justice, such as the issue of timing, leaves Just War theory better prepared to fulfil its 
critical vocation. This move away from legalism, I have suggested, will require us to 
consider both the chronotic and the kairotic dimensions of political time. While I 
have not tried to construe a full-fletched system of thought to rival legalism, the paper 
has disclosed a possible avenue for recovering case-based reasoning in the context of 
examining war – through the revisable, yet anti-sceptical attitude of pragmatism. 
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